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BOOK REVIEW
A Critique Of Adjudication:(Fin De Siecle)
BY DUNCAN KENNEDY

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997) 424 pages
In characteristically irreverent Critical Legal Studies (cLS) style,
Allan Hutchinson's 1987 review of Ronald Dworkin's Law's Empire
treated that weighty jurisprudential tome as if it was an action movie a la
the IndianaJones epics.1 If one were to turn this us spirit back upon the
recent work of one of that theoretical school's 2 most prominent voices,
Duncan Kennedy, then an amusing cinematic analogue for A Critiqueof
Adjudication: (fin de si~cle)3 might beAustin Powers: InternationalMan of
Mystery. In that film a 1960s swinger emerges from cryogenic slumber to
take on the late 1990s. The temptation to satirize is heightened by the
sense that Kennedy is offering Adjudication as a candidate for the canon
of late century jurisprudence along with the definitive works of Dworkin
and H.L.A. Hart. 4
Whether or not Kennedy would approve of such cheekiness, he
deserves better.5 While Austin Powers suggests something of the "60s
throw-back" 6 or fashionably radical 7 stereotypes that have been used to

I A. Hutchinson, "Indiana Dworkin and Laws Empire" (1987) 96 Yale LJ. 637.
2 A note on the cs label: Critical legal studies has been regularly identified as a "movement."
Professor Kennedy indicates, however, that while CLS continues as a school of thought, the
movement broke apart in the 1980s: infra note 3 at 9.
3 D. Kennedy, A CritiqueofAdudication (flin de sice) (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1997) [hereinafterAdjudication].
4 The dust jacket, at least, is clear in this regard. William H. Simon of Stanford Law School
writes: "The two principal books with which to compare Kennedy's in recent decades are H.L.A.
Hart's The Concept of Law and Ronald Dworkin's Law's Empire. Kennedy's book deserves to be as
popular as theirs." Consider it done!
5 This is not to say that Dworkin did not, but Hutchinson's review was, or is, great fun.
6 An entertaining example is provided by Scott Turow's account of his experience as a firstyear law student at Harvard. Turow's civil procedure professor, "Nicky Morris," who is apparently
modelled after Duncan Kennedy, is disparagingly referred to by some students as "Beat Nick" for
his informal demeanour, colloquial language, and abstract, humanistic approach to his subject. For
his part, however, Turow is very complimentary. See S. Turow, One L (New York: Warner, 1977).
My thanks to Larry Buhagriar for bringing this to my attention.
7 For example, Brian Langille launches a thoughtful critique of Canadian and American cs
scholarship from a mainstream perspective in "Revolution Without Foundation: The Grammar of
Scepticism" (1988) 33 McGill L.J. 452. The article, however, also evokes the tone of an exasperated
school master wagging a finger at a class room of unruly students who insist upon engaging in
"fashionable" skepticism. Also, see Madame Justice Beverley McLachlin's response to the
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deride first generation cLs scholarship, such generalizations say nothing
about the important substance of this literature. For Kennedy's part, at
least, Adjudication is a testament to the author' sensitivity to the
historical situation, limitations, and ironic dimensions of the cLs project
that has been the inspiration and the bite noire of so many since the late
1970s.
In most general terms, Kennedy associates his work with what he
refers to as the modernist/postmodernist theme of critique initiated by
the "more ambitious" critics such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Herbert Marcuse
and Michel Foucault. 8 These continental theorists challenged capitalism
by attacking "'official' or 'bourgeois' culture, 'phallagogcentrism,' and
rationalism generally." 9 Rather than taking on capitalism, Kennedy's
more modest objective is to engage many of the same
modernist/postmodernist categories and strategies to argue that the
practice of adjudication serves to reinforce economic and social
stratification in America. According to Kennedy the rational, objective
model of legal reasoning that is reflected in the written decisions of
appellate level judges represents a denial of the ideological nature of
that activity.
While Kennedy indicates that irony is a defining characteristic of
the modernist/postmodernist approach that he champions,10 irony may
work against him in the present work. Adjudication has many strengths,
and it represents a fascinating and often extraordinarily confessionary
chronicle of a jurisprudential era. But in anchoring his analysis of
judicial activity with the themes of "bad faith" and "denial," Kennedy's
work suggests a considerable reliance on the kind of self-evident
righteousness which cts literature has been so successful in exposing and
challenging in mainstream liberal legal theory. Another irony may relate
to the fact that, when it is tightly focused upon specific examples of
judicial activity and/or particular legal issues, CLS literature like
Kennedy's has provided valuable support for the idea that law is better
understood as a dynamic social process than as a static subject for
"fashionable" tendency "to characterize the judicial role as increasingly powerful, political and,
most devastating of all, essentially udemocratie": Hon. B.M. McLachlin, "Of Power, Democracy and
the Judiciary" (1991) 25 L. Soc. Gaz. 20 at 20.
8
Adjudication, supranote 3 at 5.
9 Ibid. at 8.
10 Kennedy indicates that early cLs scholarship attempted to liberate "irony," along with (get
ready) "contradiction," "alienation," "desire," "doubleness," "despair," "ecstasy," and "yearning"
from the "circular, ambiguous, or incomplete" character of rights arguments: ibid. at 345. Exactly
why the former compliment of characteristics recommends itself over the latter is not immediately
clear. The latter group is certainly easier to remember.
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positivist analysis. Unfortunately, these dynamic insights may be
uniquely resistant to clear articulation in the sweeping treatise form in
which Kennedy has chosen to trade. Accordingly, while this volume
makes a valuable contribution, it is a problematic one. Perhaps Kennedy
would have it no other way.
Some of the scope of Kennedy's more than twenty years' worth
of leftist legal scholarship is reflected inAdjudication, but he is primarily
concerned with articulating his own variation of the CLS critique of
adjudication. Kennedy's discussion touches upon social theory,
philosophy, legal education, and cultural issues. He also presents a
valuable historical overview of the American legal experience and the
currents of theory that have evolved to explain and critique this
experience, along with many interesting and provocative comparisons to
legal theory and practice in Britain and continental Europe. Kennedy
emphasizes and aligns his own project with what he calls the "viral"
strain of American legal critique, that which was born in the first half of
the century when a current of liberal thought began to argue that there
were no right answers to legal questions.11
As developed by the legal realists and us scholars, this strain of
critique has come to emphasize both the significance of policy
considerations for judicial decisionmaking and the extent to which such
considerations are ideological in nature. The picture of judges as
political actors conflicts with the liberal ideal of the rule of law in its
fullest form. This ideal presumes a substantive distinction between law
and politics, policy and ideology, adjudication and the legislative process.
While Kennedy identifies with the CLS strategy of undermining the
distinction between judicial application and judicial legislation,1 2 he
proposes to provide an "internal" critique of judicial practice. This is in
contrast to the "merely logical" critique that Kennedy attributes to other
cus scholarship.13
Kennedy's internal critique is marked by the related notions of
faith
and denial. Kennedy tells us that American legal discourse
bad
forces judges to be ideological performers, purveying decisions and
articulating rule choices that reflect familiar liberal or conservative
alternatives. 14 The bad faith character of this activity relates to the
extent to which the element of ideological choice is denied. According
11 Ibid. at 81.
12

bid. at 37.

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. at 133.
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to Kennedy, the ideological element is "a kind of secret, like a family
secret-the incestuous relationship between grandfather and
mother-that affects all the generations as something that is both known
and denied."I 5
A scheme of legislative review of judicial
decisions-"counterfactual legislative supremacy"-is discussed in
chapter 9 as a way of restricting judges' law-making power.
Kennedy treats us to some very interesting moments on the road
to identifying and defending his own patch of jurisprudential terrain.
One of these arises when Kennedy accepts that his theoretical position
between rule scepticism and legal determinism, seems to share an
uncomfortable proximity to the British legal positivist: "Oh my God, am
I really just a Hartian?"1 6 Kennedy is also prepared to accept some
common ground with Dworkin, although he distinguishes his position
from Dworkin's by indicating that "Dworkin's central distinctions,
between 'political theory' and 'partisan or personal politics,' and
between rights and policies, can [not] do the work he wants them to
do."17

The emphasis that Kennedy places upon the notion of bad faith
is among the most striking and problematic aspects of Adjudication. A
tenet of the modernist/postmodernist critical legal project is that there is
no external vantage point from which to assess the system of signs-in
this case, words-that creates, rather than merely conveys, the subject of
"law." 18 Accordingly, short of calling for an abandonment of law, which
Kennedy does not do, the best alternative is to try to make the members
of the judiciary more aware of the ideological dimensions of their
work. 19 To some considerable extent, however, the judiciary's work must
be expected to remain within the linguistic confines that define it. One
is left to wonder, then, how it is that we can know that judges are acting
in bad faith. If Kennedy is suggesting that they do so merely by acting as
15

Ibiai at 191.

16 IbiL at 177. Shortly afterwards on the same page Kennedy states that his theory is not "I
hope, hope, hope, just what the Brits have been saying all along."
17
1bid at 37.
18 Kennedy provides an overview of basic semiotic concepts at the beginning of chapter 6,
"Policy and Ideology." He contributes to the clarity of his discussion in this part by introducing
accessible concepts such as "argument bites" and "flipping" in order to demonstrate the way in
which ideology is channelled into adjudication in the guise of policy. There is, however, the odd
clanging reference such as his allusion to the "semioticization" of policy discourse, ibid. at 147. If it
qualifies as discourse, then it must be a semiotic system. Accordingly, his identification of the
process of semioticization is confusing.
19 The benefits of this alternative might include greater judicial deference to representative
institutions and judicial decision making that does more to protect and advance substantive equality.
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judges, then this concept which is supposed to characterize his
contribution to the critique of adjudication represents a fairly standard
critical generalization about the legal process.
At the heart of Kennedy's argument is the point that, given the
demonstrated lack of a substantive distinction between law and ideology,
bad faith and denial on the part of the judiciary is proven by the
apolitical tone of the opinions that they write, and the professional
discussions that they engage in to which he has been privy. 20 Essentially,
then, Kennedy demands that we attribute to judges an extraordinary lack
of sophistication. In fact judicial sophistication does not even meet the
standards of the journalists to whom Kennedy refers who regularly
characterize judges as political actors 2 1 This impoverished, even
simplistic, notion of judicial self-awareness is required in order for bad
faith and denial to operate as the kind of pejorative terms that Kennedy
seems to intend.
Frankly, many of us would probably be relieved if we could easily
accept that judges are in denial as to the ideological nature of their work,
and also that judges do not think that the public appreciates that
adjudication is ideological. This would make criticism of judicial activity
much more straightforward than it is when we engage the more complex
possibility that we are all in on the "family secret" but compelled to talk
as if we are not. In this regard, it might be as well to keep Terry
Eagleton's admonition in mind. In warning against simplistic antitheses
to dominant social ideologies, Eagleton points out that such ideologies
are "well capable from time to time of enlisting irony and self-reflexivity
on their side. Good liberals, as E.M. Forster knew, must be liberal
enough to be suspicious of being liberals."22
According to this more complex possibility, that if law is largely
distinguished from politics by linguistic conventions which are observed
within certain institutional contexts, then law's existence depends upon
judges doing "the objectivity thing" in their opinion writing. There may
be more transparent alternatives to this, 23 but they might not be law.
The exploration of extra-legal or law reform strategies or both for
pursuing social and political goals are worthwhile projects. They are not,
20 In chapter 8, "Strategizing Strategic Behaviour in Interpretation," Kennedy introduces an
"imaginative reconstruction of my three types of judges as deniers" by drawing upon "the evidence
of opinions read in their historical context, plus a little time spent at judicial conferences:" ibid. at
194.
21 Ibi. at 29.
22

T. Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990) at 379.

23 Kennedy alludes to such alternatives rather enigmatically, supra note 3 at 4.
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however, dominant themes of Kennedy's project in Adjudication.
Accordingly, the theme of bad faith takes on a strange aspect which is at
once both absolutely righteous and profoundly uncertain.
This strangeness blossoms in the latter chapters of Adjudication.
For example, Kennedy accuses those who invoke the language of rights
merely to formulate political demands of acting in bad faith. Those of us
who assume that this is as good a reason to invoke rights-talk as any, are
charged by Kennedy with taking advantage of "the other person's
good-faith belief in the presuppositions of the discourse." 24 Later,
Kennedy is willing to make a limited concession to this kind of cynicism,
as long as the cynics are true to themselves: "I am all in favour of
deploying these discourses [such as rights-talk] for strategic reasons ... as
long as the deployer has in mind the element of bad faith in his or her
performance." 2s Of the questions that arise in response to these
statements, the most pressing is why on earth this kind of self-honesty
should matter to Kennedy.26
Some of the preceding may reflect a reading of Kennedy's work
which is characteristically Canadian. It may be the case that the
personal experience of "loss of faith" in legal reasoning that Kennedy
discusses so directly2 7 is less profound in our particular legal and
historical context, somewhat because our expectations have always been
lower. Canadian legal culture is such that it has been able to produce a
figure like Frank Scott, who combined strong constitutionalist and civil
libertarian convictions with his co-authorship of the Regina Manifesto,
the radically anti-capitalist and reformist sentiments of which are still
striking.2 8 It is possible, therefore, that the link between ideology and
law has never been as much of a "family secret" here.
Furthermore, the American experience has become increasingly
relevant to Canadians since the Canadian Charter of Rights and

24

Ibid. at 310-11.

25

Ibid. at 358.

26

Some of Kennedy's earlier work dealt very compellingly with the phenomenological aspects
of adjudication, proposing interesting and usefully ways of thinking about how legal materials
represent forces of freedom and constraint upon ideologically motivated judges, without drawing
upon the kind of puritanism that bad faith and denial seem to imply. See in particular the article
upon which much of chapter 7 is based: D. Kennedy, "Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A
Critical Phenomenology" (1986) 36 J. Legal Educ. 518.

27 See Adjudication, supra note 3 at 311-14 and, in particular, Kennedy's discussion of his
experience as a second-year law student working for a law firm.
28 See generally S. Djwa, The Politics of the Imagination: A Life of F.R. Scott (Toronto:

McClelland and Stewart, 1987).
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Freedoms29 expanded the institution of judicial review in this country.
However, our approach to that institution may continue to be influenced
by the British legal tradition. Canadians might be expected to temper
their expectations for enhanced judicial power with some lingering sense
of the British model of "The Judge." As Kennedy explains it, this model
is less potent than the American counterpart. In this regard, Canadian
readers may be struck by the similarities between Kennedy's outline of
"counterfactual legislative supremacy" and the Charter's
"nothwithstanding clause." 30 Kennedy's scheme would go some way
toward undermining the mythic dimensions of the American judicial
model by making the decisions of appellate courts automatically
appealable to legislatures. Arguably, the ability of Canada's Parliament
or the provincial legislatures to pass legislation notwithstanding the
judiciary's decisions as to the scope of our fundamental freedoms, legal
and equality rights, has something of the same effect. Accordingly,
Kennedy's proposal, which challenges the American model of
adjudication, is already supposed to be factored into the Canadian
model.
Quite apart from these sorts of national and jurisdictional issues,
what contributes to difficulties in reading Adjudication is the extent to
which the static nature of conventional academic discourse is an
imperfect medium for conveying conclusions about what the dynamic,
dialectic nature of the social world means for law and adjudication. 31
While Kennedy can be commended for not conceding the field (and
taking up painting or something instead), the reader is often challenged
to distinguish substantive insights from a wealth of generalizations about
judicial activity, and limited associations with-and distinctions
from-other theoretical perspectives. This is not to say that Kennedy
"goes wrong" in his discussion. Rather, Kennedy's book supports the

29 Part I of ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.

11 [hereinafter Charter].
30

Ibid. s. 33.

31 See R. Heilbroner, Marxism For and Against (New York:- W.W. Norton, 1980) c. 2.
Heilbroner writes, at 56-57:
The hypothesis, then, is that dialectics is at bottom an effort to systematize, or to translate
into the realm of manageable, communicable thought, certain unconscious or
preconscious modes of apprehending reality, especially social reality. This hypothesis
gives us some clue as to why the exposition of dialectics leaves us satisfied at one level of
our minds while dissatisfied at another. Its ideas of flux, contradiction, and essence,
remain elusive in terms of ordinary reasoned discourse.
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observation that "[a]mbiguity, the bane of positivism, is the very essence
of dialectics."32
Mark Carter
Assistant Professor
School of Criminology
Simon Fraser University

32 Ibid. at 57.

